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War and Breaking Point   
In the Summer of 1917, not long after the United States entered the war, the former American 
ambassador to Germany, James Gerard would write the following words.   
The German nation is not one which makes revolutions. There will be scattered riots in Germany, but 
no simultaneous rising of the whole people. The officers of the army are all of one class, and of a 
class devoted to the ideals of autocracy. A revolution of the army is impossible; and at home there 
are only the boys and old men easily kept in subjection by the police. 
There is a far greater danger of the starvation of our allies than of the starvation of the Germans. 
Every available inch of ground in Germany is cultivated, and cultivated by the aid of the old men, the 
boys and the women, and of the two million prisoners of war.1  
Gerard turned out to be wrong. A revolution occurred a little over a year later, and both the US 
decision to fight and widespread hunger in Germany would play important causal roles. His 
assessment of military loyalty also proved incorrect; the rebellion was to begin amongst the 
mariners of the German navy, and the actions of both soldiers and sailors were crucial to its early 
success.  
Gerard could be forgiven for this errant prediction. For much of his tenure in Berlin Germany had 
coped well with the demands of total war, and it is certainly true that there was a rapid decline in 
German fortunes after his memoir had been published. But things had also worsened in the few 
months before he left Germany in February 1917. A poor harvest meant that the daily struggle for 
German citizens had intensified in the autumn of 1916, with food shortages leading to 
undernourishment and climbing mortality rates, especially amongst children, the elderly and the 
sick. Tuberculosis patients, in particular, died in great numbers as the quantity and quality of food 
diminished. This ‘turnip winter’ was also exceptionally cold, which contributed to a dramatic 
increase in the number of fatal heart attacks and strokes. Statistics compiled by the municipal 
authorities in Leipzig show that there were over 100 days where the daytime temperature remained 
below zero. For much of February it fell below -10.  At the same time, the cost of heating was rising. 
The situation did not improve in 1917. With American entry into the war in April, Germany’s trade 
with neutral powers was greatly curtailed, and the effect of the allied naval blockade more severe. 
Increasing numbers came to depend on the black market for staple foods, or on municipal soup 
kitchens, which, together with bread queues, became a very visible sign of social distress.2  
The growing distance between actual experience and war-time propaganda also undoubtedly fuelled 
resentment. Ordinary Germans weighed reports of military victories against personal experience of 
bereavement, and the bullish patriotism of the war food office, whose propaganda drives mocked 
the naval blockade, recast potatoes and turnips as symbols of defiance, and championed a winning 
formula of rationing and meat free days, against the experience of real hunger. The writer and 
revolutionary Ernst Toller would later draw attention to this widening credibility gap. 
Germany was hungry. Eminent scientists proved that clay had the same food value as flour, that 
saccharine-sweetened jam was healthier than butter, that dried potato tops were better for the 
nerves than tobacco and tasted just as good. But the pronouncements of scientists were of little avail 
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to the stomach, which reacted to their nonsense in its own way: people collapsed, fell sick, grew 
desperate.3  
Food shortages and war-weariness led to widespread resignation, but also fed a latent propensity 
for protest. New, politically radical organisations emerged, most notably the Spartacus League, 
under the leadership of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, and the Revolutionary Shop Stewards 
of the Berlin metal workers, and the rank and file in the mining and armaments industries, frustrated 
at union leadership, also turned increasingly to direct action. Strikes, which had been largely absent 
in the first years of war, were the main response. Some 240 occurred in 1916, including the mass 
strike of around 50,000 Berlin workers in June, launched in protest at the arrest of Liebknecht (who 
had called publicly for an end to the war). In 1917 561 strikes took place with a million and a half 
participants; the largest the ‘Bread Strike’ in Berlin in April 1917. Wilhelm Groener, head of the War 
Office at this point, and worried about the impact of the walkout on arms production, noted in 
committee that ‘it was unfortunate that the bread rations had to be reduced just when labourers 
were beginning to brighten up after the hard winter’. The Brotstreik also had a political dimension. 
Pamphlets were distributed referring to the Russian Revolution, and exhorting armaments workers 
to stop working as a way to stop the war.4   
In late January 1918 the largest strike of the war, in which over a million workers took part, brought 
much of Germany to a standstill.  Largely peaceful, the protest nevertheless escalated to the point of 
violent confrontation in some areas. In the north of Berlin, troops on horseback confronted 
barricades of overturned trams.5 This mass walkout reflected the desperate need for an 
improvement in material circumstances, but the workers’ demands were also political:  peace 
without annexations, a lifting of the state of emergency, the restoration of the rights of association 
and assembly, equal suffrage, and political amnesty for opponents of the regime who had been 
imprisoned.  
Military intervention, and the arrest and conscription of its instigators, brought an end to the 
Januarstreik, although not to the sentiment which produced it. But this crisis at home was to be 
followed by one at the front that would ultimately prove decisive. Between March and July the 
German army launched five major offensives in the West, securing territorial gains but not the 
intended strategic breakthrough. The army’s fighting strength and its morale were greatly depleted 
by the effort; battlefield casualties were enormous, and the army was also hit by the influenza 
pandemic in the summer months. In August a counterattack by the Entente forced a retreat and with 
this the German army ‘lost the belief that it could achieve victory’.6 In late September, the 
capitulation of Bulgaria, and the foreseeable impact it would have on German oil and grain imports, 
led Army Command to seek an armistice.  
 
The Revolution Arrives 
This combination of external and internal pressure forced the regime’s hand. It now appointed a 
government that would be responsible to parliament, tasked with constitutional and electoral 
reform, and - in the first instance - with securing the armistice. It heralded the end of the semi-
authoritarian rule of the second Empire, and was both a strategy to ward off revolution and an 
attempt to improve Germany’s bargaining position with the Allies, since it was felt that President 
Wilson would be better disposed towards a more liberal Germany. But within a matter of days this 
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‘revolution from above’ was to be engulfed by one from below. The catalyst was the decision by the 
navy to launch one final, honour-saving attack on the British from the port of Wilhelmshaven, a plan 
which would rob the military of any authority it still possessed and - critically -  underscore the 
‘legitimacy of collective disobedience’,7 since the idea was both futile, and directly contradicted the 
German government’s own efforts to negotiate a ceasefire.  
In the night of the 28-29 October crews in the 1st and 3rd squadrons mutinied, sabotaging their own 
ships and naval command’s subsequent decision to order the 3rd squadron back to their home port 
of Kiel, with the arrested ringleaders on board, spread rather than contained the rebellion. On the 
3rd of November a protest by sailors and workers in Kiel calling for an end to the war culminated in a 
procession to free the imprisoned mutineers.  When this was fired upon with the loss of seven lives, 
the demonstrators fought back. The next day mariners stationed at the large garrison, including 
many of the lower ranked officers, rebelled and by the evening the city was fully under their control. 
From Kiel flying columns of sailors brought the revolution to the other northern port cities, and, in 
the following days to Germany’s north-west, Bavaria, Hessen, Saxony and Wurttemberg, finally 
reaching Berlin on the 9th of November. Fears that the military leadership would respond and a 
bloodbath ensue proved unfounded when it became apparent that even ‘reliable’ soldiers would not 
fire on their fellow Germans.  A republic was declared and a provisional government of leading Social 
Democrat (SPD) and Independent Socialist (USPD) parliamentarians formed, pushing the Kaiser into 
exile. One day later, with Matthias Erzberger instructed by Groener (Chief of staff) and Friedrich 
Ebert (head of the new coalition government) to secure a ceasefire at any price, the armistice came 
into effect.       
The revolution came with a spontaneity and momentum which caught the establishment utterly off 
guard. This included the leaders of the labour movement, who had been ‘obliged to jump into the 
revolution’ so as not ‘to lose the leadership of the masses’.8 The SPD leadership would remain wary 
of such unpredictable grass-roots protest in the months that followed.  But this elemental, dynamic 
quality to the revolution did not mean that it was somehow unstructured or chaotic.  In these first 
days the movement was channelled through a country-wide network of workers’ and soldiers’ 
councils, convened in the garrison towns at barracks, battalion and regimental level, and established 
in improvised fashion in working-class neighbourhoods and workplaces, often by local union or USPD 
and SPD party branches. District and regional councils broadly shadowing the existing bureaucratic 
structure were also constituted, and, later, larger, centralized councils would appear, most 
prominently the unified Workers and Soldiers Council of Greater Berlin and the ‘Central Council’ 
(Zentralrat ) elected by delegates to a national congress held from 16th to 21st December.  
In the weeks after the Armistice the councils comprised an armed and loyal force that could be 
mobilised in the event of counter-revolution. Historians have also highlighted the important role 
that the councils played in facilitating the process of demobilisation and in ensuring the continued 
distribution of food and fuel. But contemporaries on the radical left also looked beyond this 
immediate practical function and saw in the organic, local organisation of the councils a template for 
authentic democracy, one in which decision-making ‘flowed upwards’ from the grass roots. Such 
direct participation promised to be a real alternative to the representative system of parliamentary 
democracy ‘which once in a while summons the people to the ballot box and then loses all touch 
with them for years on end’9. But it remains the case that the majority within the councils’ 
movement were broadly in favour of the parliamentary course set by the SPD and USPD leadership, 
and in most cases viewed their own power as temporary or (at best) ancillary to that of the 
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parliaments at state and national level. Delegates to the December congress voted to hold 
parliamentary elections for a constitutive assembly at the earliest opportunity, and against the idea 
that the councils should be given a fundamental role in the new constitution, a decision that 
provoked bitterness and despair amongst some on the Left.  
The assumption that there was no meaningful place for the councils in the new system was in large 
part a product of SPD antipathy towards the council movement, which it mistakenly viewed as a 
competitor and destabilising force, rather than a partner which could help to democratize Germany. 
Such distrust followed from the SPD’s abhorrence of rapid or radical social transformation; a political 
outlook which was to do much to shape the course of events that followed, chiefly because it 
brought the SPD leaders closer to elements of the old regime and guided their response to the 
episodes of radical protest that occurred from the winter of 1918/19 onwards.  
 
Cooperation with the Old Order 
To some extent the SPD leaders’ willingness to work with the existing institutions reflected the 
severity of Germany’s post-war predicament, and the desire of both new and old powers to ward of 
social and economic collapse. This ‘anti-chaos reflex’ saw the new SPD/USPD coalition and the 
councils work with the existing military chains of command and administration on the withdrawal 
and demobilization of forces, and on the surrender of materiel to the allies. The process of 
repurposing the economy for the aftermath of war, and of ensuring that the population were fed, 
clothed, and housed also necessitated cooperation with the civilian administration and a reliance on 
the expertise of existing authorities. But, as already suggested, the relationship between the SPD 
and the old order, particularly the General Staff, was conditioned not only by the need to meet basic 
social needs, but also by a shared desire to prevent the emergence of more radical political solutions 
to the problems facing Germany after the war.  At the very beginning of coalition government Ebert 
had struck a deal with Groener, now quartermaster General of the German Army, that promised him 
the loyalty and cooperation of the armed forces in return for a commitment to fight any appearance 
of Bolshevism on German soil, to ensure that the soldiers' councils remained a temporary 
phenomenon, and that the sole authority of the officer corps would be restored.  In the winter of 
1918/19 a series of crises would strengthen this fateful relationship, and, as a result, also destroy 
any chance of cooperation or reconciliation between the radicals and reformists of the German 




In mid-December, following alleged instances of theft by revolutionary sailors stationed in the Berlin 
Palace the coalition made plans to disband the unit and suspend their pay. In response they 
occupied the Reich Chancellery and placed the coalition under house arrest, also taking Otto Wels, 
the city commandant, hostage. Ebert reacted by telephoning Groener and ordering an attack on the 
palace in which 56 troops, 11 sailors, and several civilians died. Negotiations, not force, eventually 
persuaded the sailors to vacate the palace, the division intact. The episode demonstrated the 
vulnerability of a government which could call on no reliable or effective troops, something which 
was to push Ebert even closer to the General Staff. Critically, it also marked the end of the coalition, 
with the USPD leaving the government on the 29th December in protest at Ebert’s handling of the 
crisis and the SPD’s opposition to the restructuring of the army which the congress of councils had 
proposed. In this way Ebert facilitated the re-emergence of an anti-democratic military - at this point 
hatching plans to crush the councils and confer temporary dictatorial powers on Ebert – as a major 
player.  
 Ebert’s decision on the 4th of January to sack Emil Eichhorn, the Independent Socialist Berlin police 
commissioner who had refused to deploy his security forces against the sailors, provoked a mass 
demonstration on the 5th of January. Armed demonstrators went on to occupy buildings in the city’s 
newspaper quarter, and the USPD and newly formed Communist Party came out in support. The 
political leaders and occupiers formed a revolutionary committee, and called a general strike for the 
7th January and for the removal of the Ebert government. Some of the revolutionaries like the KPD 
leader Liebknecht argued that the regime should be deposed by force. Others looked to 
negotiations, but efforts to resolve the standoff peacefully failed when talks with Ebert collapsed. 
Under Gustav Noske, who had been given command in the capital, troops and paramilitary 
formations reasserted control;  on the 10th of January the Reinhard Brigade attacked Spartacist 
headquarters in Spandau, and in the following days the heavily armed Potsdam Freikorps retook the 
occupied buildings. Well over a hundred rebels and civilians caught up in the fighting were killed.  
Further excesses of violence were perpetrated against the Left during the subsequent occupation of 
the city by Freikorps, most notoriously the abduction and murder of Luxemburg and Liebknecht on 
15 January 1919 by members of the Garde-Kavallerie-Schützendivision. It is unclear whether Ebert 
knew of the plan to kill his two former SPD comrades, but there is some evidence to suggest Noske 
was directly involved. Papst, the leader of this paramilitary unit later claimed the murders could not 
have been carried out without his approval. The government’s failure to investigate the murders 
properly and to punish the culprits adequately enraged the left. Eventually brought before a military 
court, it was reported that the accused men looked as if they were attending a wedding rather than 
their own trials. Runge and Vogel, two of those responsible, were given prison sentences of two 
years four months and two years respectively, although the latter was to be spirited across the 
Dutch border by a sympathetic officer and thus escaped justice entirely.10   
In parallel with events in Berlin another crisis was unfolding in the west of the country.  By January a 
strike wave begun in the Duisburg-Hamborn mining district had escalated to the point where some 
180,000 workers were involved.  This protest was characterized by its mistrust of the unions and 
political parties. Strikers demanded ‘socialization’ with a syndicalist slant emphasising workers’ 
control over company property and profit. It was a logical response to excessively long shifts, to 
inflation (and to wages that did not keep pace with prices), to blacklisting, and to an authoritarian 
style of management that now seemed out of place.  
 
The Spring Strike Wave 
Neither the bloody resolution of the crisis in the capital, nor the end of the January strike, brought 
peace to Germany. In the months that followed conflict would both intensify and spread, in some 
places degenerating into violence of civil-war-like proportions.  In February, against a backdrop of 
rising unemployment, industrial and transport workers in the central German cities of Halle and 
Merseburg went on strike calling for co-determination and a role for works councils (Betriebsräte) in 
the running of industry. In March KPD supporters sought to channel another general strike in Berlin 
into a further armed attempt to depose the Reich government. With the city already placed under 
martial law, Noske ordered that any insurrectionists be shot on sight, and troops under his command 
went on to crush the rebellion with huge loss of life. As many as 1200 people were killed.  
This wave of protest peaked in early April, with some 400,000 on strike in the Ruhr mining areas. 
Here they were demanding shorter shifts and higher wages, recognition of the councils, the 
disbanding of the paramilitaries and diplomatic relations with the USSR. Once again there were also 
calls for socialization, not just co-determination. There followed further walkouts by industrial 
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workers and dockers in Bremen and in Hamburg in defiance of the social and economic policies of 
the new Majority Socialist led coalition. As had been the case in January the decision to halt 
production was often a response to military intervention, rather than its cause, this pattern visible in 
the city of Brunswick where on the 9th April workers struck upon the arrival of troops under 
Maercker. Ultimately, and measured against their demands, the strikers secured little, but there 
were some gains. Wages were raised, and the miners secured the seven-hour shift. In the Autumn of 
1919 paid holidays and a system of collective wage bargaining were to follow.   
The uncompromising reaction by Scheidemann’s coalition government, the first following the 
elections of 19th January, sprang from its fear of unpredictable mass protest, and also from its 
determination to minimize the impact the strikes could have on the economy. This, in turn, was 
partly driven by the threat of allied intervention if demands for workers’ control were to become 
more widespread and disruptive. But, as Kluge has argued, whilst they demanded the reassertion of 
order, the Allies did not require that this be achieved through such violent means.  
With Noske as Minister for the Army, the government response was wholly disproportionate, 
particularly given the fact that much of the protest was not an attempt to replace the fledgling 
parliamentary democracy, and that, prior to the war, the ‘broad church’ of German social democracy 
had managed to contain both reformists and radicals. It also amounted to an irrational faith in the 
army as a force that could bring order, since military intervention often generated further unrest in 
the first instance.  Noske’s approach went so far beyond what was required to defeat the radicals, 
that with Kluge one is left wondering quite ‘what drove the Reichswehr minister to carry out his task 
as protector of public security in such an extreme and inhumane fashion.’11 The SPD’s willingness in 
this situation to also give right-wing, anti-democratic paramilitaries a free-hand has also attracted 
the attention of historians. Although they were recruited as Noske’s henchmen, the Freikorps had 
absolutely no commitment to the Republic. Indeed, only a year later, in the Kapp Putsch of March 
1920, they would attempt to destroy it. Responsible for scores of political murders of Left-Wing 
activists, they would also go on to kill other prominent politicians of the era, notably the Centre 
Party’s Matthias Erzberger (1921) and the DDP’s Walther Rathenau (1922). 
 
Munich 
The final bloody chapter of Germany’s revolution also began with a political assassination, that of 
USPD Bavarian Minister President Kurt Eisner, murdered on the way to submit his resignation 
following his party’s miserable performance in the January election. That Eisner was Jewish as well 
as a socialist, and had also openly acknowledged German war guilt, made him an obvious target for 
radical nationalists. In the words of his murderer, the 22 year old student Anton Graf Arco auf Valley, 
he was killed because he was ‘a Bolshevik, a Jew, and no German’.  Eisner’s death marked the 
beginning of a new, more radical phase of the Revolution in Bavaria, one in which any chance of a 
diarchal rule involving both parliament and the councils would disappear as a struggle between the 
two systems descend into open warfare.  
The councils in Bavaria had retained their political influence under Eisner, even after the Bavarian 
parliamentary elections on January 12th. In the power vacuum that followed his death a congress of 
councils called for the state’s parliament to be dissolved and for the formation of a provisional 
‘national council’, a course rejected by the parliamentary SPD, who would only accept a ruling 
cabinet responsible to the state parliament. In March a minority government was formed on this 
basis composed of SPD and USPD politicians under the SPD’s Johannes Hoffmann. Hoffmann’s 
cabinet did not command the support of the working class, whose economic circumstances were 
deteriorating rapidly. In this context the Zentralrat headed by the left-wing SPD politician Ernst 
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Niekisch, and composed of USPD, SPD and KPD representatives declared the parliament dissolved, 
and, on the 7th April, rejecting further cooperation with what it described as the ‘contemptable 
government’ in Berlin, announced the establishment of an independent ‘Bavarian Councils Republic’. 
A new government of people’s commissars headed by Ernst Toller was to be very short-lived, 
replaced in a matter of days by a second, Communist-led ‘Councils Republic’ on the 13th April, a 
further shift to the Left which had been triggered by a right-wing coup attempt. Hoffmann, whose 
government had long since retreated to Bamberg, requested assistance from Berlin. It arrived in the 
form of 30,000 regular troops and Freikorps; a wave of white terror that would break on the city 
with ‘bestial ferocity’.12 As many as one thousand were killed during the fighting to retake Munich, 
and hundreds more were executed in the weeks that followed. Amongst the dead leading figures of 
the rebellion such as Gustav Landauer, Max Levien and Eugen Leviné, and scores of civilians who had 
no direct involvement. 
     
Legacy 
The violent suppression of rebellion was to have profound consequences for the new Republic. The 
bloodbaths of Berlin and Munich ruined the chances of future cooperation between the radical and 
moderate Left, preventing any effective, united resistance by the SPD and KPD to National Socialism 
in Weimar’s final years. The SPD’s relationship with the General Staff also facilitated the re-
emergence of the army in its old unreconstructed form. It meant that the Weimar Republic did not 
have the support of a republican army, but one predisposed to authoritarian rule. This neglect of 
institutional reform and the relative failure of government to democratize the economy has led 
historians to describe the German Revolution as one that stopped half way, with union leaders and 
government seen as obstructing the political will that existed for a socialization of industry. But if the 
revolution ground to a halt in 1919, its momentum had still delivered Germany a more democratic 
system than it had possessed before the war. Government was now responsible to parliament and 
women could now vote. The weighted franchises that had corrupted state politics were gone, 
including Prussia’s notorious three-class voting arrangement. The first national elections in January 
1919, conducted in chaotic circumstances, had also produced a national assembly where a majority 
was held by parties who supported the republic. There were some grounds for optimism.   
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